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Auditor independence is gaining a lot of attention 
from researchers, regulators and public observers. 
This has been described to have a major significant 
impact on audit quality. Several reasons have been 
given for the crucial importance of auditor 
independence to audit quality and this has formed a 
longstanding debate among academics, regulators 
and market observers on how best to protect 
auditors and mitigate concerns from users of the 
financial report (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). The 
accounting scandals of publicly listed entities 
ignited the scrutiny and criticism by market 
regulators and independent observers on the 
credibility of audit reports, and also industry 
experts‟ reactions to Enron scandal prompted the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 (Dattin, 
2017; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; Velte & Loy, 2018). 
Most important, the earliest research to 
investigate the impact of auditor independence on 
audit quality was greatly attributed to DeAngelo 
(1981). According to DeAngelo (1981), audit quality 
greatly depends on auditor independence and has 
been defined as the probability that the auditor will 
uncover and report any breach in the accounting 
system. The concern to auditor independence is 
highly imperative, because of its magnitude to 
financial credibility and this has been the reason 
why market regulators are more concern about the 
independence of auditor to provide high audit 
quality that meets the international standard and 
that can be relied upon by the users of financial 
statements (Dattin, 2017; Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; 
Velte & Loy, 2018). 
The accounting fraud and the collapse of major 
companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Satyam, 
Cadbury in Nigeria; Olympus in Japan dent serious 
blow to audit profession and the aftermath of global 
financial crisis provide another avenue for market 
regulators and practitioners in questioning the 






How to cite this paper: Yakubu, R., & 
Williams, T. (2020). A theoretical 
approach to auditor independence and 
audit quality. Corporate Ownership & 
Control, 17(2), 124-141. 
http://doi.org/10.22495/cocv17i2art11 
 
Copyright © 2020 The Authors 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International 




ISSN Online: 1810-3057 









Auditor independence and the quality of audit report is of 
growing concern to regulators, institutional investors and 
stakeholders as a series of accounting scandals have undermined 
the professionalism of auditors. The findings from this study 
produced an insight of how auditor‟s independence improve 
audit quality and that abnormal audit fees is as a result of 
additional effort for auditor to carry out rigorous audit 
engagement as a result of wider audit scope; that mandatory 
audit firm rotation will enhance auditor independence, and that 
audit committee with nonexecutive independence will promote 
audit quality. The study also finds that in terms of auditor size, 
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& Loy, 2018; Zhang, Hay, & Holm, 2016). However, 
auditors‟ independence on audit quality was 
questioned after the post-Enron scandal. Much of 
the criticism came from shareholders, regulatory 
bodies and market observers who argued on the 
independence of auditors. In line with this 
development, there are key attributes or dimensions 
suggested by regulators to safeguard auditors in 
providing high audit quality and promote 
independence (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015). One of such 
attributes to safeguard auditor independence in line 
with SOX Act and the EU audit reform of 2014 is to 
restrict auditors from providing most non-audit 
services (NAS) to their clients (Tepalagul & Lin, 2015; 
Velte & Loy, 2018). Additionally, Tepalagul and Lin 
(2015) state that SOX imposed a 1-year cooling-off 
period for former auditors gainfully employed at 
their clients; and also that the Act requires 5 years 
of audit partners rotation. Dattin (2017) is of the 
opinion that mandatory rotation of auditors or audit 
firms serves to safeguard auditor independence. 
Meanwhile, Velte and Loy (2018) posit that SOX 
prescribed only mandatory audit partner rotation.  
A sound audit report is of high quality if, it is 
free from material errors or fraud and the auditor 
gives the true and fair view of the report. The 
auditor must carry out a systematic review of the 
client‟s accounting system and ascertain the degree 
at which the financial report can be trusted by 
investors, and also communicate the area that needs 
greater attention to the management. The 
independence of the auditor and the services 
rendered is seen as a cornerstone of audit quality. 
However, an area of consistent concern is to look at 
all the variables that can impair auditor 
independence taking into consideration the quality 
of audit report issued. 
The International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC) reveals five threats to auditor independence: 
self-interest, self-review, advocacy, familiarity, and 
intimidation; all this shaped the engagement of 
auditors. Similarly, there is awareness put in place 
by different regulatory and professional bodies such 
as the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) for quality control and 
Association of Certified Chartered Accountants 
(ACCA) code of professional conduct for members. 
Auditors are expected to comply with these 
standards and comply with the code of conduct 
throughout audit engagement. 
As financial reporting served as the basis for 
making an economic decision, shareholders and 
creditors make investment and credit decisions 
based on this report. These accounting scandals 
have led to regulatory reform in audit practices 
(Zainudin & Hashim, 2016). Furthermore, these 
regulations had formed part of academics discussed 
such as mandatory audit firm and audit partner 
rotation in order to safeguard auditor‟s 
independence and promote audit quality (Alzoubi, 
2017; Krishnan & Zhang, 2019; Mali & Lim, 2018). 
However, there exist debates among scholars 
whether mandatory audit firm rotation (MAFR) or 
mandatory audit partner rotation (MAPR) will 
strengthen the independence of the auditor in 
providing quality audit reports (Mali & Lim, 2018). 
Mali and Lim (2018) found that MAFR has a negative 
effect on audit quality when the company switches 
from Big 4 to non-Big 4. 
Another crucial threat linked to impair auditor 
independence that has attracted the attention of 
regulatory bodies, researchers and industry experts 
is NAS fees. As observed by Singh, Singh, Sultana, 
and Evans (2019), abnormal NAS fees are positively 
associated with earnings management when partner 
tenure is short. In the Chinese context, Ji, Lu, and 
Qu‟s (2018) research is aimed to determine the 
effect of internal control weaknesses (ICW) on audit 
fees. The authors found that companies with 
internal control risks pay higher audit fees. 
Similarly, Yen, Lim, Wang, and Hsu (2018) found that 
firms with internal control breach pay higher audit 
fees. Previously, Yang, Yu, Li and Wu (2018) also 
report a significant increase in audit fees paid by the 
high risked firm. MohammadRezaei, Mohd-Saleh, 
and Ahmed (2018) used data of firms listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange to examine whether highly 
ranked audit firms in Iran charged higher fees and 
provide quality audit services. The study revealed 
that highly ranked audit firms charged higher audit 
fees than lower-ranked firms. Meanwhile, on quality 
audit services provided, the study documented no 
significant difference between the highly ranked 
audit firms and non-highest ranked firms. 
Based on this, auditor and client relationship 
has a significant effect on audit quality. According 
to Soltani (2007), independence exists where the 
auditor can make an objective decision throughout 
the audit process. Thus, auditor independence 
depends on the relative importance of the clients, 
not on the type of services provided. Furthermore, 
researchers, practitioners and market observers 
have contributed to the auditing profession by 
providing cutting edge research on how best to 
protect auditors‟ independence and enhance audit 
quality. 
The aim of this research is to gain an 
understanding of the impact of auditor 
independence on audit quality. However, in order to 
understand auditor independence, it is necessary to 
gain insight into certain elements that have been 
previously identified by researchers as paramount to 
audit quality, also to explore other barriers than can 
impair audit quality within the context of auditor 
independence. It would be difficult to understand 
how the auditor can attain full independence 
without knowing the drivers or potential barriers 
both strategic and operational behind audit 
engagement, and it is also important to clarify those 
barriers to auditor independence and audit quality. 
Further, this research will assess existing 
frameworks supporting auditor independence; 
explore relevant theories and guidelines from 
practitioners in regard to audit matters. 
The following objectives have been identified of 
paramount importance in helping to achieve the 
aforementioned aim within the context of auditor 
independence; the specific objectives of this 
research is to identify the relationship between 
auditor fees, auditor tenure and new regulatory 
reforms to protect auditor independence, non-audit 
services, board composition and auditor size on 
audit quality. 
The above objectives focus on emerging issues 
in the field of auditing and where the research will 
make key contributions. The stated objectives 
should not be seen as separate or unrelated 
activities rather they are necessarily interlinked. The 
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first objective is to look at the effect of audit fees on 
audit quality. For example, when audit firm charges 
their client abnormal fees, will that impair 
independence and make auditor give biased opinion 
especially where the client contribute large 
significant of the audit firm income, which in turn, 
can influence some decision that will be taken on 
the financial report. Second, this article will focus 
more on relevant regulatory reform on audit 
tenure/rotation in the best interest of quality report. 
Third, this article will further answer the question 
whether non-audit services, board composition and 
auditor size have any significant effect on audit 
quality. Finally, this article will provide 
recommendations and practical implications from 
the review of relevant literature. 
 
2. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
Auditors play a very crucial role in capital market 
development, as some investors rely on the audit 
report, a scenario where auditors express the true 
and fair view of the financial statements. This role 
goes beyond reviewing the financial statements, it 
also involves providing support to market regulators 
and the audit committee in supervising management 
(Velte & Loy, 2018). More important, Sikka and 
Willmott (1995) posit that professional accountants, 
auditors and regulatory bodies should devise the 
best strategy to promote the principle of 
independence in order to defend, define and protect 
the image of the accounting profession. The 
professionalism of auditors has not really being 
criticised as far back 1980s when audit profession is 
known to promote the principle of accountability, 
integrity and transparency for appropriate 
judgement with well support fact during the audit 
process, which in turn, help users of the capital 
market make investment decisions (Zainudin & 
Hashim, 2016). It is pertinent at this stage to gain an 
understanding of the motive behind financial 
reporting fraud by management (Zainudin & Hashim, 
2016). There is an increasing number of studies that 
have explained the consequences of audit 
rotation/tenure, audit fees and non-audit service on 
audit quality (Mitra, Jaggi, & Al-Hayale, 2018; Velte & 
Loy, 2018; Zainudin & Hashim, 2016). 
Conceptually, Some observers have linked audit 
quality to the fees charged by audit firm, that is, the 
effect of audit fees on audit quality, and it is said to 
represent amount required by the auditor to 
conduct a proper audit agreed between audit firm 
and its client (Alhadab, 2018; Mitra et al., 2018; 
Zainudin & Hashim, 2016). Meanwhile, Alhadab 
(2018) documented a positive relationship between 
abnormal audit fees and audit quality. Accordingly, 
the author revealed that abnormal audit fees 
represent an additional amount of audit fees 
charged by an audit firm based on client 
relationship not necessarily on the size and 
complexity of its client audit work. Shan, Troshani, 
and Tarca (2019) study utilised sample of 
Australian-listed companies between 2005 and 2015 
to test the association between managerial 
ownership and audit firm size and audit fees. The 
study documented for companies that are located in 
the entrenchment region, there is a positive 
association between managerial ownership and audit 
firm size/audit fees, and negative association for 
companies whose managerial ownership is located 
in the convergence of interest regions.  
Auditor integrity is a key component in audit 
engagement and auditor independence is 
fundamental to the public confidence, particularly in 
the aftermath of corporate failures, this makes way 
for regulatory frameworks to safeguard capital 
markets, shareholders and other stakeholders who 
rely on audit report for economic decisions 
(Fearnley, Beattie, & Brandt, 2005). The financial 
regulators have put in place standards and declared 
their opinion on the state of auditor independence, 
and also whether the auditor poses the necessary 
skills to meet the needs of their clients and other 
stakeholders. In Iran, Zahmatkesh and Razazadeh 
(2017) examined the effect of work experience, 
professional competence, motivation, accountability 
and objectivity of the auditor on audit quality. The 
authors concluded that apart from motivation all 
other identified attributes enhanced audit quality. 
There are a serious concern to auditor independence 
and the quality of audit report. Most issues raised 
are more on possible impairment to auditor 
independence. For example, there have been 
concerns over audit fees (Blankley, Hurtt, & 
MacGregor, 2012; DeAngelo, 1981; Huang, 
Raghunandan, & Rama, 2009; Menon & Williams, 
2001; Yao, Percy, & Hu, 2015), audit tenure (Dopuch, 
King, & Schwartz, 2001; Kwon, Lim, & Simnett, 2014; 
Myers, J. N., Myers, L. A., & Omer, 2003), and the 
need to ensure efficient and effective board 
composition (Wan Abdullah, Ismail, & Jamaluddin, 
2008; Bryan, 2017; Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Lenox, & 
Mauler, 2015; Ghafran & O‟Sullivan, 2017; Wu, Hsu, 
& Haslam, 2016). The identified attributes will form 
a major focus of this research. 
Although auditor independence and audit 
quality are gaining attention from academics, 
practitioners and other market commentators due to 
its impact on capital market development. For this 
important reason, this research work will also 
contribute to the development of auditor 
independence in a number of important ways by 
adding more evidence to available research. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This research work will contribute to the existing 
literature on the effect of auditor independence on 
audit quality by identifying different research 
findings from scholarly articles and explores various 
theoretical frameworks to support audit quality and 
make a generalization.  
The research strategy that will be used to 
implement the identified objectives is a systematic 
literature review (SLR) approach. This involves the 
study of various manuscripts, government 
publication and other relevant materials that are 
imperative in forming and exploring the research 
objectives. SLR has been identified as the best 
approach for reviewing scholarly researches because 
of the „clarity, equality, transparency, accessibility, 
originality and unified‟ (Pittaway & Cope, 2007; 
Sirelkhatim & Gangi, 2015). This approach has its 
roots in health-related research, however, in the past 
decades and because of its importance, another 
discipline within business management begins to 
adopt this approach (Saunder, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2016). Furthermore, SLR gives an opportunity to 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 17, Issue 2, Winter 2020 
 
127 
openness and attention to details as it helps to 
analyse and synthesise relevant research studies for 
the purpose of clarity and understanding of policy 
and practical implication in order to give an overall 
picture of the research evidence (Saunder et al., 
2016). 
In other words, academics and various market 
commentators on auditor independence continue to 
call for regulating frameworks that are proactive in 
monitoring how audit firms carry out their 
engagement in order to avoid another Arthur 
Anderson. Several studies have documented audit 
fees, audit tenure, audit size and board composition 
as likely factors to impair audit quality (Blankley et 
al., 2012; DeAngelo, 1981; Kwon et al., 2014; Menon 
& Williams, 2001; Myers et al., 2003; Yao et al., 
2015). There is a need to carry out a cross-country 
review of each identified variable that will form the 
research objectives on auditor independence and 
make meaningful opinions and recommendations on 
the subject matter. This research is timely as it will 
contribute to the current debate rocking the 
mandatory auditor rotation in Europe by extensively 
reviewing related literature of similar studies carried 
out in other countries that have implemented almost 
the same policy on mandatory rotation and the 
impact on audit quality.  
This SLR will provide an insight into the 
academic debate on auditor independence and also 
provide a recommendation that will serve as a guide 
for policymakers in enacting future laws that aim to 
improve audit engagement. Further, to gain a 
meaningful picture of how auditor independence 
improves audit quality, it is imperative to consider 
those variables associated with auditor 
independence with a good support literature review. 
For example, auditor tenure, auditor fees, auditor 
size, non-audit services and board composition. With 
the above-identified attributes, SLR will be 
conducted using some search engines and 
manuscripts published in refereed peer-reviewed 
journals Business Source Premier, Science Direct, 
Elsevier, Google Scholar, Wiley Online Library, 
Springer Link, Sage Premier and Emerald Insights. 
The following search term included: “audit quality”, 
“audit fees”, “tenure/rotation”, “independence” and 
“corporate governance”.  
 
4. INTRODUCTION TO A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 
 
This literature review will examine the main issues 
surrounding the impact of auditor independence on 
audit quality, attributes and drivers of audit quality 
and regulatory frameworks that are available to 
support auditors when carrying out audit 
engagement. The review of related literature on this 
study focuses on audit fees (low and abnormal fees), 
auditor tenure, non-audit services, board 
composition and auditor size on audit quality. 
A significant contribution will be made to this 
research, by considering the above areas of literature 
in details. Similarly, barriers to quality audit reports 
will be examined. In effect, the value of studying the 
aforementioned literature will be to provide a 
meaningful discussion of auditor independence, 
importantly, regulatory frameworks to support this 
research in a structured way, and to facilitate a 
critical understanding of key issues in these areas 
and a clear justification in the field of auditing. 
There are the different methodologies used in 
conducting research on auditor independence, they 
are usually analytical, archival, experimental, 
questionnaire and survey-based. Analytical deals 
with critical thinking that require statistical 
inference with cause-effect relationships through 
meta-analysis or mathematical modelling to prove a 
hypothesis. Archival research is more of panel data 
that are usually held in archives. It has been proved 
to be more complex but improves the validity and 
data generated is more reliable. On the other hand, 
experimental research also concentrates mainly on 
the causal relationship and in an attempt to 
maintain or manipulate control over variables to 
achieve the required objective and explain the real 
phenomena. 
Given the nature of this research, it is primarily 
qualitative in nature with an in-depth review of the 
literature using a systematic literature review (SLR) 
approach and necessary interpretation of results to 
give true meaning in their natural setting within the 
theory of auditor independence and audit quality. 
Adequate attention will be given to each objective to 
bring out the real context of the study. These 
objectives are inter-related and will be well review to 
provide an insight on how auditors‟ engagement 
with management is perceived by stakeholders, 
regulators and the general public as many investors 
used the published financial statement to make an 
investment decision. 
 
4.1. Review of the empirical literature 
 
This study build on the previous research to auditor 
independence and audit quality by Tepalagul and Lin 
(2015) where their research work was structured 
based on four threats to auditor independence, 
namely client importance, non-audit services, 
auditor tenure and client affiliation with audit firms 
and Velte and Loy (2018) work on the impact of 
auditor rotation, audit firm rotation and non-audit 
services on earnings quality, audit quality and 
investor perceptions. The study of relevant literature 
revealed that auditor independence to audit quality 
is complex and requires a thorough investigation 
because most of the available findings to audit 
quality are mixed (Velte & Loy, 2018). There is no 
agreed definition of auditor independence; different 
observers have highlighted different opinions. 
According to Tepalagul and Lin (2015) auditor 
independence has a great impact on audit quality 
and could be affected by the length of time the 
auditor works for a client. This research reviews 
existing literature related to auditor independence 
and audit quality in line with stated objectives: 
auditor fees, auditor tenure, non-audit services, 
board composition and auditor size. 
 
4.2. Audit fees 
 
The 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) played a major 
role in audit pricing (Climent-Serrano, 
Bustos-Contell, Labatut-Serer, & Rey-Martí, 2018). 
Accordingly, the authors stressed that the crisis 
significantly affects audit firms, leading to high 
competition among auditors and reduction in audit 
fees. Conceptually, it is imperative to note that GFC 
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raised issues in the audit industry where 
stakeholders have different opinions on how the 
crisis may have a great impact on auditors‟ 
independence, audit fees, and audit quality. Audit 
fees popularly defined as an amount required by the 
auditor to conduct a proper audit agreed upon by an 
audit firm and its client (Yao et al., 2015). Chen, 
Krishnan, and Yu (2018) found no significant 
difference in audit quality of audit firms that 
charged lower fees during GFC and audit firms with 
no fees cut. Meanwhile, Larcker and Richardson 
(2004) acknowledged that the relation between audit 
fees and non-audit fees paid to auditors have a 
negative impact on auditor independence. In China, 
Mao, Qi, and Xu, (2017) examined the association 
between audit firm membership on audit fees and 
audit quality. The authors found that member firms 
charged high audit fees than non-member firms, but 
could not conclude whether it has an impact on 
audit quality. However, their findings are in line with 
Bills, Cunningham, and Myers (2015). Sultana, Singh, 
and Rahman (2019) reported a positive association 
between joint audits and higher audit fees, but find 
no significant impact of joint audits on abnormal 
accrual. 
When considering the high demand for quality 
audit services and determining fees charged by 
auditors, it is essential to note that auditor‟s 
proximity to their clients played a major role. Beck, 
Gunn, and Hallman (2019) study focused on the 
geographical decentralisation of audit firms and 
audit quality. The main aim of the research was to 
determine the impact of audit firm office proximity 
with their clients on audit quality. The study 
revealed a positive relation between audit office 
proximity and audit quality. Furthermore, the 
authors found that decreased proximity between 
offices leads to reduced inter-office audit quality 
spillovers. Choi, Kim, C., Kim, J. B., and Zang (2010) 
also document an association between office size 
and audit quality, as measured by abnormal accruals 
and audit fees. Lesage, Ratzeinger-Sakel, and 
Kettumen (2016) report a positive association 
between joint audits and higher audit fees, but find 
no significant impact of joint audits on abnormal 
accrual. 
 
4.3. Low and abnormal audit fees 
 
Although there is little evidence to show the 
relationship between lower audit fees and audit 
quality. Simunic (1980) audit fee model shows that 
the additional remuneration paid to the auditor is as 
result of future engagement to its client. However, 
Eshleman and Guo (2013), Higgs and Skantz (2006), 
Mitra, Deis, and Hossain (2009) found a positive 
association between abnormal audit fees and audit 
quality. Blankley et al. (2012) found that clients 
paying abnormal audit fees are less likely to 
subsequently restate their earnings and where 
auditors consistent in doing a better job by 
preventing accounting irregularities from taking 
place throughout the audit process. The economic 
intuition is that auditor independence is paramount 
to the credibility of financial statements as 
shareholders and other creditors make investments 
decision based on the published audit reports.  
The earliest report by Dopuch and King (1996) 
experimental evidence on quality report reviewed 
that a high degree of lowballing decreases audit 
quality in non-competitive market settings. However, 
the work of Gul, Fung, and Jaggi (2009) found no 
relationship as to whether lowballing reduced 
earnings quality. Climent-Serrano et al. (2018) also 
found no evidence as to whether low audit fee 
reduces audit quality. Meanwhile, a review by 
Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon (2015) stressed that 
the evidence associated with audit fees‟ negative 
impression on audit quality is an indication of 
additional effort/engagement by the auditor rather 
than an effort to subvert independence. In Uganda, 
Kaawaase, Assad, Kitindi, and Nkundabanyanga 
(2016) documented that higher audit fees charged 
are as a result of quality audit work and additional 
audit effort. Cho, Ki, and Kwon (2017) explained the 
effect of accrual quality on audit fees by concluding 
that auditor spends more time on a company with a 
high level of cash flow risk which led to high audit 
fees. Mazza and Azzali (2018) analysed the impact 
of information technology (IT) control quality on 
audit fees. They concluded that IT compliance firms 
pay low audit fees.  
There are recent studies that explain the effect 
of tournament incentives (pay gap) on audit fees 
(Bryan & Mason, 2017; Jia, 2017). Their studies 
acknowledged that audit risk and audit business risk 
likely to occur as a result of tournament incentives 
which may cause the audit firm in charging high 
audit fees (Bryan & Mason, 2017; Jia, 2017). 
Previously, Ding and Jia (2012) found that top-tier 
auditors may use their increased market power to 
charge high audit fees; nevertheless, with total 
independence, such auditors will be able to provide 
high-quality audit services. The support mechanism 
highlighted by Ronen (2003) related to audit quality 
is the provision of Financial Statement Insurance 
(FSI) which suggest that an insurer would hire 
auditor to assess the probability of a misstatement 
and eliminate inherent conflict of interest and that 
the firm will provide premium and coverage to 
protect its shareholders and signal direct investment 
towards better project.  
Regarding the pre- and post-SOX, Charles, 
Glover, and Sharp (2010) found that the magnitude 
relationship between financial reporting risk and 
audit fees more doubled between the pre-SOX and 
post-SOX, suggesting for a better way in which audit 
firms priced risk. Meanwhile, Hribar, Kravet, and 
Wilson (2014) found that a negative association 
between fee residual and that audit quality reflects 
greater auditor‟s effort in response to lower 
financial statements quality. In relation, Quosigk, 
Krauß, and Zülch (2014) research on competitive 
audit market documented that low-balling fees 
cutting practices do not impair auditor‟s 
independence. Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui (2015) 
examined the relationship between family firms and 
non-family in terms of fees paid to auditors using 
Bangladesh listed companies. They confirmed that 
family firms pay higher audit fees and hire specialist 
auditors than non-family firms.  
Using Indonesia setting, Veronica and 
Anggraita (2016) found that abnormal audit fees 
have a negative effect on audit quality and that the 
economic bond between the auditor and the client as 
well as audit premium is a significant threat 
indicator to auditor independence. Interestingly, 
very similar results were found in an earlier study of 
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Choi et al. (2010) which posit that abnormal audit 
fees are negatively associated with audit quality 
when relating to positive abnormal audit fees. 
Alhadab (2018) documented a positive relation 
between abnormal audit fees and audit quality. In 
Tehran, Salehi, Farhangdoust, and Vahidnia (2017) 
found no empirical evidence that abnormal audit 
fees are associated with firms restating their 
financial statements using panel data of 930 firm-
year observations from companies listed on the 
Tehran Stock Exchange during 2009-2014. In Korea, 
Jung, Kim, and Chung (2016) examined the impact of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
adoption on abnormal audit fees and audit quality 
using empirical data from 2008-2013. The authors 
report a positive relation between abnormal audit 
fees and discretionary accruals in the post-IFRS 
period. In Malaysia, Yaacob and Che-Ahmad (2012) 
found a significant increase in audit fees in the post-
IFRS adoption using panel data during 2004-2008. In 
New Zealand, Redmayne and Laswad (2013) 
documented a substantial increase in audit fees and 
audit effort in the first year of IFRS adoption. 
Similarly, Raffournier and Schatt (2018) found that 
Swiss firms applying IFRS pay higher audit fees. In 
China, Lin and Yen (2016) documented positive 
relation between audit fees and IFRS adoption for 
audit firm with IFRS experience prior to 2007, and 
that audit client with previous IFRS experience pay 
low fees in the initial years of IFRS adoption. In 
Australia, De George, Ferguson, and Spear (2012) 
report a positive relation between audit fees and 
transition to IFRS. Kim, Liu, and Zheng (2012) report 
that mandatory IFRS adoption by EU countries 
increases audit fees. Meanwhile, Kharuddin, 
Basioudis, and Hay (2019) linked fee premium to 
audit firm industry expertise. Ettredge, Fuerherm, 
and Li (2014) found no evidence as to fee pressure 
differential between larger auditors and audit 
offices, and that the financial report misstatement 
of 2008 likely occurred due to fee pressure from 
management.   
On whether audit committee gender has effect 
on audit fees, Aldamen, Hollindale, and Ziegelmayer 
(2018) examined the impact of female member audit 
committee using 624 Australian companies, the 
authors report that a female member among the 
audit committee would require additional services 
from the audit firm and in turns have significant 
impact on audit fees, and this also supported by Lai, 
Srinidhi, Gul, and Tsui (2017). In terms of audit 
partner gender to audit quality, Al-Dhamari and 
Chandren (2018) found that female audit partner 
from Big 4 audit firms provide high audit quality 
report and enhance investors‟ confidence in making 
investment decision, Montenegro and Bras (2015) 
acknowledged positive female-dominated audit 
partner on audit quality in Portuguese audit market, 
and Garcia-Blandon, Argiles-Bosch, and Ravenda 
(2019) findings also support female partner to 
provide quality audit services. Habib, Hasan, and 
Al-Hadi (2018) found that audit fees charged by an 
external auditor to U.S. companies are a result of the 
high rate of money laundering records.  
The review of related literature has mixed 
reactions as to whether auditor fees lead to audit 
quality or impaired auditor independence during the 
audit engagement. Much of the research 
documented that abnormal audit fees are as a result 
of additional efforts by auditor rather than to 
subvert its independent, while others have shown 
that where auditors are overpaid this will impair 
audit quality and allow the client to engage in 
opportunistic earnings as such auditors would like 
to maintain a longer relationship with their clients. 
Meanwhile, André, Broye, Pong, and Schatt (2016) 
could not ascertain whether higher audit fees charge 
by auditor improves audit quality. No doubt, audit 
fees play a big role in auditor independence 
especially where the audit market is highly 
saturated; the likelihood of opinion shopping and 
management discretion is high. Chiang and Lin 
(2012) researched audit-client relationships of 
Taiwan listed companies comparing pre- and post-
Enron. They found a threat to auditor independence 
before Enron which is greatly influenced by 
management decisions and the likelihood of auditor 
compromised. Furthermore, that post-Enron 
evidences a great awareness on the side of the 
auditor when making a decision on the audit 
engagement, working to a maximum level of 
professionalism and become more conservative in 
their audit work.  
In terms of gender on audit fees and audit 
quality, most of the findings revealed that female-
dominated audit partner and audit committee works 
towards achieving high audit quality (Al-Dhamari & 
Chandren, 2018; Cameran, Francis, Marra, & 
Pettinicchio, 2013; Lai et al., 2017; Montenegro & 
Bras, 2015). Furthermore, available findings 
document an increase in audit fees when firms 
switch to IFRS (De George et al., 2012; Raffournier & 
Schatt, 2018; Redmayne & Laswad, 2013). 
 
4.4. Auditor tenure 
 
After the accounting scandals involving Enron and 
WorldCom in 2000 which led to the passage of SOX 
Act of 2002 preventing auditors from providing 
some specifics NAS and also the 2008 financial crisis 
paved way for regulators calling for the mandatory 
audit firm/partner rotation. The proposition that 
extending auditor‟s tenure is associated with a 
decrease in audit quality and impaired auditor 
independence calls for serious concern. However, 
Myers et al. (2003) found that financial reporting 
quality does not deteriorate with auditor tenure 
elongation, also supported by Garcia-Blandon and 
Argiles-Bosch (2016) using samples from Spanish 
companies. Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2004) 
supported mandatory audit rotation as this 
according to the author will have a positive impact 
on the capital market. However, Carey and Simnett 
(2006), Chi and Huang (2005), Liu and Wang (2008) 
both confirmed the likelihood of long audit partner 
tenure leads to diminishing audit quality when 
issuing GCOs. Meanwhile, Zhang et al. (2016) found 
no evidence of loss of independence for lengthy 
tenure. Ghosh and Moon (2005) reported a more 
likely influence of the increase in future earnings as 
auditor tenure increases. Azizkhani, Daghani and 
Shailer (2018) documented lower misstatements in 
financial statements of firms in the first two years 
tenure of auditor-client relationship compare to 
longer tenure; however, their study could not find 
evidence of misstatements in the year preceding 
audit firm rotation. 
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4.5. Auditor rotation 
 
Specifically, insight to auditor rotation by Raiborn, 
Schorg, and Massoud (2006) found that where new 
auditor lacks the knowledge of the company‟s 
accounting information system, operations that 
revolve around the financial statements and also 
lack financial reporting practices will drastically 
reduce audit quality. In Italy, Cameran et al. (2013) 
opposes mandatory auditor rotation and support 
longer auditor tenure as it will enhance audit 
quality. On the other hand, Bryan and Reynolds 
(2016) believed that mandatory auditor rotation 
would only enhance audit quality of small audit 
firms who are not industry specialists.  
There has been a long-standing debate on the 
mandatory auditor rotation. The proponent side 
suggested for audit partner rotation while the 
opponent called for audit firm rotation. There are 
assertions that auditor rotation will improve audit 
quality and enhance auditor independence while 
others believe firms pay more fees to hire new 
auditors and the new auditors‟ lack of accounting 
system of the client results in audit failure. 
Regarding mandatory rotation, Choi, Lim, and Mali 
(2017) reported low audit quality for mandatory 
audit firm rotation than mandatory audit partner 
rotation, while Big 4 firm provides high audit quality 
than non-Big 4 if audit firm is rotated. Meanwhile, 
Sayyar, H., Basiruddin, Zaleha, Rasid, and Sayyar, L. 
(2014) found that there is a positive relationship 
between partner rotation and audit firm rotation to 
audit quality and that financial reporting 
transparency will increase as a result of high audit 
quality. Chen, Lin, C. J., and Lin, Y. C. (2008), Chi, 
Huang, Liao, and Xie (2009), Ionescu (2014), Kaplan 
and Mauldin (2008) documented a negative 
association between audit partner rotation and audit 
quality. Accordingly, Bamber, E. M. and Bamber, L. S. 
(2009) found no evidence that audit partner rotation 
improved audit quality in Taiwan. Jackson, Moldrich, 
and Roebuck (2008), Shafie, Hussin, Yusof, and 
Hussain (2009), Wang and Tuttle (2009) suggested 
that only audit firm rotation enhanced auditor 
independence and audit quality. Meanwhile, 
Daugherty, Dickins, Hatfield, and Higgs (2013) found 
that mandatory partner rotation increases the 
workloads and the likelihood of re-location, and that 
partner would rather venture into a new industry 
than to relocate. In addition to auditor tenure, there 
were findings that low audit quality and audit failure 
is as a result of short audit firm-client relationships 
and they could not relate longer audit tenure to low 
audit quality (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson, 
Khurana, & Reynolds, 2002; Manry, Mock, & Turner, 
2008; Myers et al., 2003). Bamahros, Wan-Hussin, 
and Abdullah (2015) confirmed that long audit 
tenure reduces earnings management in Malaysia. 
However, Bell, Causholli, and Knechel (2015) 
reported that tenure elongation reduces audit 
quality. Previously, Wan-Hussin and Bamahros 
(2013) documented that extending audit firm tenure 
does not anywhere impair audit quality, and it will 
be unwarranted in legislating audit firm rotation in 
Malaysia. In support, Bratten, Causholli, and Omer 
(2019) reported a positive association between 
longer audit firm tenure and financial reporting 
quality for a bank with a more complex scope. Ernst 
and Young (2013b) cited in Bamahros et al. (2015) 
believe mandatory partner rotation will be more 
effective than mandatory audit firm rotation in 
strengthening auditor independence and improve 
audit quality. Further, Fargher, Lee, and Mande 
(2008) found that mandatory audit partner rotation 
of different firms will enhance audit quality and 
reduce manager discretional power. Meanwhile, in 
China, Bandyopadhyay, Chen, and Yu (2019) have 
mixed findings on mandatory partner rotation 
(MPR).  
Thus, Rainborn et al. (2006) reported that if 
knowingly in the future that another audit firm 
would be reviewing the auditor‟s reports made by 
the current audit firm this would greatly generate 
some internal pressure to be less amenable to 
potential client‟s manipulation. Ruiz-Barbadillo, 
Gomez-Aguilar, and Carrera (2009) examined the 
impact of mandatory audit firm rotation in Spain 
testing two competing hypotheses of pre and post 
mandatory rotation period and could not ascertain 
any likelihood that mandatory rotation requirement 
is associated with firm issuing higher GCOs. Further, 
as for equity risk premium, there is no relation 
between audit firm tenure and shareholders‟ 
perception of independence (Boone, Khurana, & 
Raman, 2008). In Jordan, Baker and Al-Thuneibat 
(2011) reported a negative association between 
longer audit firm tenure and audit quality but 
increase in equity risk premium. In Italy, Corbella, 
Florio, Gotti, and Mastrolia (2015) reported lower 
audit fees for Big 4 auditors of firms that implement 
rotation, while audit fees remain the same for firms 
audited by non-Big 4 who do not rotate audit firm.  
Since the passage of SOX in 2002, the auditor 
has been more conscious in carrying out their audit 
engagement. The law also led to PCAOB which many 
believed to have enhanced audit quality. PCAOB 
carries out four primary functions such as 
registration, standard-setting, inspection and 
enforcement on audit firms to improve financial 
reporting quality. PCAOB monitoring teams posit 
that auditors must be “intellectually” honest to 
restore public confidence and avoid any audit 
deficiencies throughout their engagement. Many 
scholars have conflicting opinions on whether 
PCAOB inspections improve audit quality or rather it 
increases the cost of auditing and drives many small 
firms out of the audit market (DeFond & Lennox, 
2011; Read, Rama, & Raghunandan, 2004). 
Meanwhile, PCAOB inspection process has been seen 
by other researchers to improve audit quality 
(Gramling, Krishnan, & Zhang, 2011; Krishnan, J., 
Krishnan, J., & Song, 2017; Lamoreaux, 2013; Nagy, 
2014). There is also a new EU law called mandatory 
audit tendering that requires companies to rotate 
their auditor. This law was enacted in April 2014 but 
effective from 2016 requiring mandatory rotation 
for its members‟ nations (Horton, Tsipouridou, & 
Wood, 2018). Dattin (2017) is of different opinion 
whether mandatory audit firm rotation will improve 
audit quality in France. Horton et al. (2018), 
however, find that investors in Europe react 
positively to mandatory audit rotation as proposed 
by the EU audit reform. In the US, Reid and Carcello 
(2017) found that there are negative reactions to 
mandatory audit rotation in the US stock market for 
a company currently receiving high audit quality. 
Garcia-Blandon, Argiles-Bosch, Castillo-Merino, and 
Martinez-Blasco (2017) assessed the provision of EU 
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Regulation No 537/2014 on NAS and audit firm 
tenure in Spain. The study revealed that tenure 
elongation of more than ten years and NAS fees 
charged if greater than 70% (70% as the cap rate) will 
not reduce audit quality. Rickett, Maggina, and Alam 
(2016) found that the EU mandatory auditor rotation 
will enhance audit quality of firms in Greece. 
Wan-Hussin, Bamahros, and Shukeri (2018) are of 
the opinion that changing partner engagement may 
lead to the new partner providing low audit quality 
as they may have limited knowledge about the 
client‟s accounting systems.  
Much of the research that opposed mandatory 
rotation happened before the 2008 financial crisis. It 
was during the crisis that different regulatory 
bodies, professionals and academics called for 
mandatory rotation to prevent future audit failures 
and enhanced auditor independence. From the 
review of literature, it can be ascertained that 
mandatory audit firm rotation will eliminate the 
familiarity threat of auditor-client relationship, 
boost investors‟ confidence and send a positive 
signal to the capital market. However, when 
considering the mandatory rotation of audit firms, a 
specialist and highly experienced audit firm will 
charge higher audit fees than a non-specialist. 
Jackson, Moldrich, and Roebuck (2008) supported 
mandatory audit firm rotation as this will boost 
investor confidence and enhance financial reporting 
quality. Other literature also confirmed that lengthy 
auditor tenure does not impair audit quality and 
affect auditor independence and that PCAOB 
inspection has also improved audit quality. Shahzad, 
Pouw, Rubbaniy, and El-Temtamy (2017) examined 
investors‟ perception of audit quality during the 
global financial crisis (GFC) and the authors found 
that irrespective of auditor size and audit fees 
charged, investors reacted positively to the quality 
of audit report received during GFC. 
 
4.6. Non-audit services, board composition and 
auditor size 
 
This research review available literature on auditors 
providing Non-Audit Services (NAS) to their clients 
and the effect on audit quality. Over time, the 
economic bond between auditors and management 
increases, and also resulted in lengthy relationships 
as more NAS are provided. The provision of NAS has 
been debated by professionals and regulators as to 
the effect on auditor‟s independence and audit 
quality. Regulations to limit NAS provision by audit 
firms are in countries such as the US and UK etc. 
The SOX Act of 2002 stands as the most enforceable 
legislation prohibiting auditors from providing 
management advisory services, internal audit and 
other services as specified by the act. However, 
many commentators asserted that the provision of 
NAS by audit firms provides more income than an 
ordinary audit. The question raised by researchers is 
to how this service provided by the auditor will not 
impair their independence and reduce audit quality. 
The provision of NAS by audit firm as suggested 
may increase the knowledge spillover of auditors to 
understand the accounting framework of its clients. 
However, issues were raised during Arthur Anderson 
scandal in regards to audit firms engaging in NAS 
and still could not improve the financial reporting 
quality rather it led to the collapse of Enron. There 
are different methodologies researchers have 
adopted in the course of their research to determine 
the effect of NAS on audit quality and the likelihood 
of auditor compromising independence. A meta-
analysis by Habib (2012) suggested that financial 
regulators should relax the restriction placed on 
audit firms as to the provision of NAS as this will 
have adverse on the knowledge base of the 
accounting system of their clients. In support, 
Wahab, Gist, and Majid (2014) revealed that the 
provision of NAS will lead to knowledge spillovers 
and which in turn, improve audit quality. Meanwhile, 
regulators have been advised to look at the 
environment where the auditors operate in 
determining the level of restriction they will place on 
auditors from providing NAS (Causholli, Chambers, 
& Payne, 2014). The restriction placed on auditors 
from providing NAS took different dimensions after 
post-SOX as more attention is on auditor 
independence and audit failures.  
Specifically, many of the empirical studies 
believed where auditors develop expertise in the 
client‟s accounting system this will improve the 
financial reporting quality. Before SOX Act, audit 
firms provide NAS for clients especially the Big 4 
where financial reporting quality and auditor 
independence have not really been criticised. There 
were concerns that auditors may compromise 
independence in regard to NAS, and meaningful 
guidelines were identified as paramount to avoid 
any familiarity threats between auditor and 
management. The main support mechanism 
highlighted by SOX is to limit or prohibit an auditor 
from carrying out internal audit and management 
advisory services. The regulatory requirement 
prohibiting audit firm from providing tax advisory 
services have improved auditor independence in 
appearance (Aschauer & Quick, 2018). The authors 
advise the regulatory body in the EU that these two 
measures placed on audit firms, that is, audit firm 
rotation and restriction on tax advisory services may 
not lead to higher audit quality rather; it may lead to 
high audit fees. Public perception of auditor‟s 
expertise and the quality of financial statements is 
important considering the accounting scandals that 
have occurred in the past. As long as the 
relationship between the audit firm and 
management in providing NAS is lengthy and there 
is a likelihood of fess pressure form management 
audit quality will greatly suffer. In Bahrain, Al-Ajmi 
(2009), Khasharmeh and Desoky (2018) found that 
the provision of NAS affects auditor‟s independence 
and the likelihood to impair audit quality. Van 
Liempd, Quick, and Warming-Rasmussen (2018) 
contend that joint audit services and NAS may result 
in impairment of perceived auditor independence. 
Meuwissen and Quick (2019) postulated that the 
provision of NAS and audit service negatively affect 
auditor independence using data from the 
perception of German supervisory board members. 
Meanwhile, Bleibtreu and Stefani (2015) found 
that the provision of NAS by auditor improves audit 
quality as audit firms develop more expertise in the 
client‟s accounting system and that this is will not in 
any way impair auditor independence. Furthermore, 
Lim and Tan (2008) documented that a specialist 
auditor who provides NAS to management will 
improve audit quality than a non-specialist auditor. 
Another analytical research using Korean accounting 
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firms by Lee (2015) found that the revenue-based on 
auditing firms increases with the provision of 
management advisory services than the provision of 
tax consultants as a measure of productivity. In 
Malaysian, Bamahros et al. (2015) for instance, used 
discretionary accrual in relation to NAS to measure 
earnings management of 525 firms for the period 
2009. The study revealed that NAS fee for that 
period leads to high positive discretionary accrual 
and the likelihood of auditor compromising 
independence.  
However, available findings from SLR could not 
relate provision NAS to impaired independence and 
reduced audit quality. Further, some findings 
documented that knowledge spillovers of auditor‟s 
expertise of clients‟ accounting systems will enhance 
audit quality. Walker and Hay (2013) suggested that 
knowledge spillover might not enhance audit quality 
immediately but gradually as auditors develop 
expertise from clients‟ accounting systems in 
subsequent years. Also, Zhang and Emanuel (2008) 
used NAS as a surrogate for earnings quality in New 
Zealand. The authors revealed that auditors still 
maintain independence even with a high level of NAS 
provided to management, and also that this could 
not be related to earnings conservatism reduction. In 
Spain, Castillo-Merino, Garcia-Bladen, and Martinez-
Blasco (2019) study revealed evidence of (a) negative 
association between future other NAS fees and audit 
quality (proxied by restatements, earnings surprises, 
meeting or just beating earnings benchmarks and 
audit opinion) and (b) no significant evidence that 
tax service fees and audit-related services impair 
audit quality. Zhang et al. (2016) examined the effect 
of NAS on auditor independence in the Norwegian 
audit market. The study found no association 
between auditor providing NAS and loss of 
independence of mind and appearance.  
 
4.7. Board composition 
 
The relationship between auditor and board member 
is crucial to financial reporting quality and the 
independence of the auditor. Where audit firms 
enjoy full support from management and auditor 
independence not impaired will enhance audit 
quality. There are concerned regarding an auditor-
management relationship, a series of accounting 
scandals in the past has led to professionals and 
regulators devising an appropriate mechanism to 
prevent future audit failure and safeguard 
independence. The existing mechanism used by 
researchers to explain the managerial role and board 
independence as a proxy for audit quality is known 
as agency theory. The theory explains the 
relationship between auditors, management and 
shareholders. 
Although corporate governance is more 
concerned about how companies are controlled and 
run by management. The rules are set out to stand 
as a guide that must be followed in everyday 
activities of the organisation. Sultana et al. (2019) 
called for improved corporate governance that 
accommodates audit committee experience for 
better financial reporting quality. Amin, 
Lukuviarman, Suhardjanto, and Setiany (2018) report 
a positive association between audit committee 
independence, experience and size on earnings 
quality in Indonesia context. Agency theory 
demands total maximization of organizational goals 
from managers and prevents them from engaging in 
a futuristic increase in earnings management. 
O‟Sullivan (2000) examined the impact of board 
composition on audit quality using audit fees as a 
proxy. The author revealed that the support giving 
to the auditor by non-executive will result in audit 
quality. Yang, Liu, and Mai (2018) study analysed 
9861 samples of audit firm-year observations from 
Chinese A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2015 
in order to determine whether female auditors 
provide higher audit quality than male auditors. The 
study found, among other things, that male auditors 
provide higher audit quality than female auditors.  
As for audit committee expertise, Ghafran and 
O‟Sullivan (2017) examined the impact of audit 
committee expertise on audit quality and the effect 
on audit fees paid by FTSE 350 companies. They 
revealed that high audit fee paid by these companies 
is a result of audit committee member that possess 
a higher level of financial knowledge (non-
accounting). Lisic, Myers, Seidel, and Zhou (2019) 
found that audit committee with accounting 
knowledge help auditor to detect and report internal 
control weaknesses. Bilal, Chen, and Komal (2018) 
report a positive relation between audit committee 
financial expertise and earnings quality. Sultana et 
al. (2019) report a significant impact of increasing 
monitoring role that auditor and audit committee 
experience has on audit quality. Meanwhile, Zaman, 
Hudaib, and Haniffa (2011) report that the audit 
committee‟s effective monitoring of the audit 
process leads to wider audit scope and higher audit 
fees, which in turn enhances audit quality. Wu, Hsu, 
and Haslam (2016) also revealed that board 
independence and financial expert selection of 
auditor will improve audit quality.  
In sum, SOX Act excludes management from 
auditor selection, that is, management has a great 
influence on auditor which may result in audit 
failure. Meanwhile, Dhaliwal et al. (2015) suggested 
that management exclusion from auditor selection 
and appointment is unwarranted as there is no 
evidence to support their involvement has a negative 
impact on audit quality. Abdullah et al. (2008) found 
that board independence and institutional 
ownership will both improve financial statement 
decisions and promote auditor independence in 
Malaysia audit market. Bryan (2017) revealed that 
audit firms with a well organised and coordinated 
labour union provide high audit quality. 
 
4.8. Auditor size 
 
Professional competence and expertise are key 
attributes to be considered when appointing an 
auditor. Management will prefer an audit firm with a 
high reputation and size as this will greatly enhance 
financial reporting quality. Bills, Cunningham, and 
Myers (2015) could not relate firm size to audit 
quality. They suggest that a small audit firm that 
belongs to a professional association provides 
higher audit quality as a large audit firm. However, 
Choi et al. (2010) revealed that audit size and 
auditor expertise have a significant impact on audit 
quality. PCAOB inspection laid more emphasis on 
smaller audit firms and the likelihood of audit 
failure and impairment of auditor independence. 
Al-Ajmi (2009) found that Big 4 auditors are more 
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likely to provide quality audit reports than 
non-Big 4. Bae and Lee (2013) confirmed that larger 
audit firm provides higher audit quality. Similarly, 
Hu (2015) postulated that auditor size has a positive 
impact on audit quality. Beardsley, Lassila, and Omer 
(2018) documented misstatement in the client 
financial statements audited by large audit offices. 
Their findings revealed that misstatement occurs 
from auditors providing NAS to their clients in the 
presence of audit fees pressure. Minutti-Meza (2013) 
does not find any evidence as to financial reporting 
quality differentials between specialist and non-
specialist auditors as well as audit firm size. 
Nevertheless, a professional auditor with industry 
experts will provide higher audit quality than non-
professionals.  
The review of literature on NAS provision and 
NAS fees on audit quality and auditor independence 
produced mixed findings. Most studies show that 
the provision of NAS lead to knowledge spillover 
and that auditor expertise of the client‟s accounting 
system enhances financial reporting quality. As for 
board independence, if the auditor is appointed and 
selected by non-executive, management and audit 
committee auditor will be more transparent and 
diligent throughout audit engagement. However, 
some articles find that where management has a 
significant influence on the auditor, and where audit 
firms economically depend on their client this might 
have a negative impact on audit quality. 
Furthermore, in terms of audit size, most studies 
documented that larger audit firms and the 
specialist auditor will provide higher audit quality 
than smaller audit firms and non-specialist. 
Meanwhile, there is evidence that where smaller 
audit firms belong to professional bodies they will 
provide a quality audit report. Hohenfels and Quick 
(2019) used a 2567 sample of firm-year observations 
from German listed firms between 2006 and 2013 to 
test the association between the level and type of 
NAS fees pay to the auditor on audit quality. The 
study revealed that NAS fees pressure negatively 
affect audit quality (proxied by earnings 
management). 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Research on auditor independence reached its 
heights of dominance in academic circles after 
accounting scandals involving top corporate 
organisations such as Enron, WorldCom, Cendant, 
Adelphia, Parmalat and Satyam (Zainudin & Hashim, 
2016). This research work examines the relationship 
between auditor independence and audit quality. 
There are concerns from various researchers, 
professionals, regulators, and stakeholders on how 
auditor independence so crucial in driving the 
financial market as creditors and institutional 
investors relied on the credibility of financial 
statements and the quality of audit reports. 
Nonetheless, there is also a question of the 
reliability of using auditor‟s opinion in making the 
investment, particularly when a series of accounting 
scandals have tarnished the professionalism of 
auditors. 
The most important part of this research was 
the review of various studies on auditor 
independence and audit quality. The study was 
designed to identify the main threats to auditor 
independence and the need to provide academic 
findings in the field of auditing. The SLR focused on 
the following objectives: auditor fees, auditor tenure, 
non-audit services, board composition, and auditor 
size. After a thorough review of the literature, it is 
evident that auditor independence must promote 
financial reporting transparency and the audit 
report must be completely free from material 
misstatements.  
Meanwhile, the first objective addressed the 
relationship between audit fees and audit quality. 
Much of the review is on an archival study to 
determine the effect of the fees on auditor 
independence and audit quality. The archival 
research documented that higher audit fees come 
from additional efforts by auditors and could not 
relate whether fees pressure from management 
impaired auditor‟s independence to give modified 
audit opinions. Analytical research by Mironiuc and 
Robu (2012) found that below audit fees resulted in 
a high risk of financial reporting fraud of companies 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange between 
2001 and 2002.  
The second objective evaluates auditor tenure 
and relevant regulatory frameworks to promote 
auditor independence and enhance audit quality. 
The analytical study by Ghosh and Moon (2005) 
revealed that longer auditor tenure may likely 
increase future earnings manipulation. Furthermore, 
the study found that, among other things, the long 
relationship between the audit firm and client will 
improve audit quality. Vanstraelen (2000) called for 
mandatory auditor rotation as this will prevent 
auditors for compromising independence and 
provide audit quality. Cameran, Prencipe, & 
Trombetta (2016) study is aimed to assess the audit 
quality during the auditor engagement period using 
abnormal working capital accrual (AWCA) as a proxy. 
The study revealed that audit quality greatly 
improves during the last period of auditors' 
engagement than the initial year of the audit process 
as the auditor has developed high-level expertise of 
the client‟s accounting system. Most of the archival 
studies on auditor tenure could not relate tenure 
elongation as the factor that could impaired auditor 
independence and reduced audit quality (Bamahros 
et al., 2015; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Myers et al., 
2003). Some studies proposed for mandatory 
partner rotation while others called for audit firm 
rotation as a way to improve audit quality and 
prevent the auditor from engaging in opinion 
shopping. For experimental research, Daniels and 
Booker (2011) explored a loan officer‟s perception of 
auditors‟ independence. The study found that 
auditor independence and quality audit is perceived 
by loan officers only when there is a rotation of 
audit firm rather than auditor tenure. In a similar 
study of public perception towards auditor 
independence and audit quality, Gates, Jordan 
Lowes, and Reckers (2006) found that audit firm 
rotation increases public confidence in financial 
statements quality and boost auditor independence. 
Meanwhile, on a survey and questionnaire-based 
research by Said and Khasharmeh (2014) using 
Bahrain setting of rotation effect on audit quality, 
102 questionnaires were distributed to auditors in 
Bahrain audit market to ascertain their perception of 
mandatory rotation and tenure elongation. The 
authors found that audit quality improve when the 
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audit firm is rotated, and that partner tenure 
elongation impaired auditor independence and 
reduce financial reporting quality. Mardini and Tahat 
(2017) distributed a questionnaire to 43 Qatari listed 
firms to determine the advantages and 
disadvantages of auditor rotation on audit quality. 
The authors revealed that there is the enhancement 
of audit quality and positive investors‟ reaction to 
auditor rotation, and Alzoubi (2017) documented 
the positive impact of auditor tenure, auditor size, 
industry specialist and independence on audit 
quality in Jordan.  
The literature clearly shows that auditors must 
display a high level of professionalism, 
accountability and transparency when reviewing the 
financial statements of their clients. The auditor 
must not work under any form of pressure as this 
may likely impair independence especially where 
decision making is highly influenced by 
management. There are situations where the auditor 
will receive a threat from its client, this normally 
occurs when the audit firm economically depends on 
such a client and prevent the auditor to express the 
true and fair view of the financial statement. This 
act calls for a regulatory approach prohibiting 
auditors from providing certain NAS, where there is 
a high risk of familiarity threats between auditor 
and management which may end up in auditor 
compromising independent or a conflict of interest 
between both parties. However, where the auditor 
has absolute power to make a decision without 
management interference and where auditors 
develop a high level of skills in the accounting 
system of the clients in regards to the provision of 
NAS will greatly improve audit quality. Thus, 
increased workload of auditors can also be 
detrimental to audit quality unless where adequate 
provision and relevant techniques to manage such 
pressure is in place. To seek more explanation to 
NAS, it is common among audit firms especially in 
the area of consulting to audit clients prior to Enron 
scandals. However, the most literature review that 
the magnitude of NAS provided by Arthur Anderson 
resulted in impaired independence. 
In terms of board composition, most studies 
documented a strong working relationship between 
auditor and board committee result in higher 
financial reporting quality. Lee, Mande, and Ortman 
(2004) revealed that both the audit committee and 
board of director independence promote auditors' 
independence and enhance audit quality. They 
further state that where the auditor has the support 
of the audit committee and board of directors this 
will limit any mitigating factors that can lead to 
auditor‟s resignation when carrying out audit 
engagement. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) used a 
management earnings forecast as a proxy for both 
the corporate board and the audit committee. The 
study found, among other things, that strong board 
composition and corporate governance lead to high 
financial reporting disclosure and accurate earnings 
forecast by managers. However, Bliss (2011) 
postulated that independent boards with CEO 
duality will negatively affect audit quality and 
compromised the independence of its members. The 
bottom line of this is that for financial reporting 
quality to be achieved the board of directors and 
audit committee must be independent especially 
when taking decisions relating to financial 
economics of the firm. Auditors should be given 
adequate support when exercising opinions without 
bias and intimidation.  
More important, evidence from a systematic 
review of literature on audit fees could not relate 
higher fees as factors that will impair auditor 
independence and reduce audit quality. In addition, 
most studies conclude that abnormal audit fees 
charged resulted from an additional effort from 
auditors to carry out a rigorous audit process in its 
client accounting system. Some researchers relate 
abnormal audit fees as bargaining power due to 
auditors‟ expertise and market-dominant to carryout 
proper audit quality (Ding & Jia, 2012; Yao et al., 
2015). Furthermore, other studies suggested that 
auditors will charge lower audit fees where the 
market is highly saturated and that the fees 
reduction does not in any way impair auditor 
independence. On the contrary, Asthana and Boone 
(2012) revealed that lower audit fees may influence 
auditor independence and affect audit quality, 
especially where management has strong negotiating 
power to influence the fees to pay to the audit firm. 
Although much of the research provide better 
documentation that abnormal audit fees result in 
auditor providing high audit quality and maintaining 
independent throughout the audit process. However, 
auditors should ignore any fees pressure that may 
likely impair their judgement and reduce financial 
reporting quality that provides room for opinion 
shopping.  
Furthermore, the recent EU regulations on 
mandatory auditor rotation also form the basis for 
this academic research. The result so far is mixed, 
however, there are few scholarly contributions to 
determine the effect on audit quality. Dattin (2017) 
could not ascertained whether mandatory audit firm 
rotation will improve audit quality in French context, 
Garcia-Blandon, et al. (2017) also differed in opinion 
about the new EU regulations on auditor tenure and 
NAS in Spain, as the authors revealed that longer 
tenure more than as required by the law and NAS 
greater 70% will not reduce audit quality. Rickett et 
al. (2016) posit that EU mandatory auditor rotation 
will enhance audit quality, and also supported by 
Horton et al. (2018) as their finding revealed that 
investors in Europe reacted positively to mandatory 
audit rotation. This information is pivotal for 
countries that are planning to introduce mandatory 
audit rotation. However, adequate care should be 
taken in implementing this policy and geographical 
location should also be put into consideration.  
Similarly, regulators have been advised to relax 
the law prohibiting auditors from providing NAS to 
their clients. This is believed to result in knowledge 
spillovers that produce high audit quality. Chu and 
Hsu (2018) found that the provision of NAS before 
SOX impair earnings quality but could not ascertain 
its effect on earnings quality after the SOX Act has 
been enacted. However, the authors supported the 
Act as it has strengthened the independence of the 
auditor. Further, auditors‟ expertise in the 
accounting system of their clients reduces earnings 
management and enhances financial reporting 
quality. After Arthur Anderson saga and the post-
SOX Act, most studies conclude that the provision of 
NAS does not impair auditor independence and 
reduce audit quality. 
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In terms of board composition, it is 
recommended that the audit committee, non-
executive independence and strong corporate 
governance policy will protect auditor independence. 
Mitra et al. (2018) are of the opinion that strong 
board composition and monitoring increase high 
demand for audit quality. In essence, where auditors 
are selected and appointed by board consists of 
audit committee and shareholders this will reduce 
future audit failures. Zalata, Tauringana, and 
Tingbani (2018) found that a high proportion of 
female financial expertise on audit committee board 
reduce earnings management in US and Aldamen et 
al. (2018) found that female member committee 
affects the fees charged by audit firm as they 
demand more services from auditors. Lai et al. 
(2017) report higher earnings quality for firms with 
board gender diversity.  
In short, a smaller audit firm that belongs to 
professional bodies will provide audit quality the 
same as a larger audit firm. The demand for big 
audit firms is high, nevertheless, management 
should look beyond size effect when selecting and 
appointing an auditor. After Arthur Anderson saga 
the opinion of many commentators is shifted to 
competence and expertise rather than the size of the 
firm. As stated earlier, specialist and professional 
auditors will promote transparency and provide 
better audit quality than non-specialist. Specifically, 
auditors should restore public confidence by 
displaying a high level of professionalism and 
promote accountability throughout audit 
engagement. Their independence should provide 
high-quality audit reports that can be relied upon by 
investors. 
This research work contributes to the existing 
literature by extending on the study Tepalagul and 
Lin (2015) where the authors called for more studies 
on lower audit fees as a factor that can impair 
auditors‟ independence. From the review of 
literature, there are more studies on abnormal audit 
fees as a proxy for audit quality than lower audit 
fees. In addition, more empirical studies should be 
conducted on auditor independence and audit 
quality by generating data at a cross-country level to 
compare the relationship between abnormal fees 
and lower fees effect on auditor independence and 
audit quality. Alhadab (2018) showed that a higher 
level of abnormal audit fees enhanced audit quality 
in the UK using sample from FTSE 350 proxied by 
earnings management. Alzoubi (2017) suggested 
that audit quality attributes (auditor tenure, size, 
specialist and independence) and debt financing (low 
debt) reduces earnings management in Jordan. 
Similarly, Alareeni (2019) found that the following 
audit firm attributes (size, NAS, audit client tenure, 
industry specialization) enhanced audit quality.  
This systematic review strongly recommends 
that researchers should explore developing 
countries in the context of audit fees, auditor tenure 
and board composition as much of the studies are 
from developed and emerging countries. 
 
6. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATION 
 
This research is more of a literature review, and it 
cannot be said to represent the total generality of 
academic findings, so adequate caution must be 
exercised in interpreting the reliability of this study 
within the context of auditor independence. In fact, 
from the manuscript review, it could be ascertained 
that audit fees charged by professional member 
firms are higher than non-member firms and, that 
highly-risked client pays high audit fees. 
In terms of gender effect on audit fees and 
audit quality, there is evidence that a female 
member either as a member of audit committee or 
audit partner influence the audit fees charged and in 
turn lead to higher audit quality (Aldamen et al., 
2018; Al-Dhamari and Chandren, 2018; Lai et al., 
2017).  
The study underlines the need for regulators, 
policymakers and different accounting bodies 
should enact future laws based on existing findings 
from researchers, professionals and stakeholders in 
the field of auditing. This research also calls the 
attention of policymakers to relax the law 
prohibiting auditors from providing certain NAS to 
their clients. While the push for mandatory audit 
rotation continues to generate debate among market 
commentators and particularly for countries 
preparing to enact the law, this research has 
provided insight by presenting evidence from 
different countries. PCAOB inspection has also been 
said to improve audit quality, however, the 
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